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Summary 
 
This Country Focus discusses the effects of the reform of the severance payment regime
on job-to-job mobility in Spain. Job-to-job mobility is important in the process of
allocation of resources towards more productive sectors and companies. Prior to the
reform in 2012, Spanish employees hired under open-ended contracts enjoyed a
particularly generous severance payment regime by international standards. This is
likely to have contributed to the observed comparatively low job-to-job mobility. The
2012 labour market reform, amongst other things, introduced a cap on the severance
payment of employees hired with open-ended contracts, mainly with the aim of
encouraging new hires. A possible positive side effect of the reform may be to decrease
employees' disincentives to job mobility. 
In the current macroeconomic context, job-to-job transitions are far too infrequent
events to estimate directly the impact of the reform on job mobility. Instead, we analyse
the impact of the reform on the search rate of employees hired on open-ended contracts –
the so called "on-the-job search rate". The hypothesis of an increase in search behaviour
after the reform is tested empirically. The results support the hypothesis of a significant
increase in job search behaviour post-reform, which may translate into higher levels of
job mobility once employment creation moves more sustainably into positive territory
and more vacancies materialise.  
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 Employment protection legislation and job mobility 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) consists of a broad set of rules and 
procedures, grounded primarily in legislation, court rulings, collectively-and-
individually-bargained conditions of employment and customary practice, defining 
limits to firms' freedom to terminate private employment relationships. Its rationale is to 
address the risks to job security for workers by imposing a series of legal requirements 
on firms with respect to termination of employment. The impact of EPL on labour 
market outcomes has been the subject of numerous studies. Both empirical evidence and 
theoretical arguments suggest that, EPL can have both positive and negative effects. 
EPL stabilises employment across the cycle and has positive impact on employment 
duration and on the investment rates of firms. In the presence of high job mobility, 
transaction costs and sunk costs at firm level (in the form of investment in job-specific 
training) discourage employers from investing in the development of skills.  
At the aggregate level, nevertheless, very low job mobility is also detrimental to growth. 
Job mobility facilitates structural economic changes by reallocating employment in the 
face of changing economic conditions. Moreover, it can contribute significantly to 
innovation, particularly in knowledge-intensive sectors, to the extent that movement of 
workers across firms and sector allows for transmission of knowledge and experience. 
The fact that, both in Spain and in other countries characterised by high labour market 
duality, employees hired on open-ended contracts typically display higher education 
levels further potentially limits knowledge and technology spill-overs. Finally, in 
cyclical upswings, increased on-the-job search by employees keeps the costs of job 
creation more contained for firms, since it expands the pool of potential hires from 
which firms can draw. Consequently, wages are less volatile and incentives to post 
vacancies remain high (Krause and Lubik, 2007). Furthermore, excessively strict EPL 
adversely affects job and employment mobility:1 it obstructs job creation and labour 
reallocation by discouraging firing and hiring and lengthens the duration of 
unemployment. The negative effects of excessively strict EPL are particularly harmful 
to vulnerable workers (Neumark, 2000).  
A recent study by Gielen and Tatsiramos (2012) finds that workers are less likely to quit 
their jobs in countries with excessively strict job protection and relates the lower job-to-
job mobility to higher expected risk of subsequent layoffs and job mismatch. The 
authors also find that the wage increase demanded by workers when changing jobs is 
significantly higher in countries with higher EPL. Where expectations of the net gains 
of job mobility are lower, on-the-job search rates are also likely to be lower and 
probably less responsive to business cycle, as larger (expected) wage increases are 
needed in order to trigger a more intense on-the job search. Graph 1 shows how search 
rates vary across EU Member States, reflecting to some extent the degree of external 
labour market flexibility: as expected higher and more volatile search rates are generally 
found in countries with relatively less strict EPL.2 
In this paper, we consider the impact of the severance payment regime on job-to-job 
mobility. Spain is characterised by a relatively generous severance payment system by 
international standards,3 with entitlements rising relatively steeply with increasing 
tenure. As severance payment entitlements are lost when changing employer, tenured 
employees hired with an open-ended contract face a substantial disincentive to job 
mobility. Indeed, as shown in Graphs 1 and 2, the search intensity is particularly low 
amongst Spanish employees hired with open-ended contracts from an international 
perspective and not particularly responsive to the business cycle.  
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The 2012 labour market reform eliminated some of the obstacles to employment 
mobility in Spain by increasing the predictability of dismissal costs, increasing internal 
flexibility, reducing the segmentation between the employment conditions of permanent 
and temporary workers and reviewing the system of collective bargaining.4 A further 
important element of the reform was to introduce a cap on severance payments for all 
employees hired on open-ended contracts and to reduce the accrual rate of entitlements, 
in order to stimulate permanent job creation. Specifically, the severance payment for 
unjustified dismissals was reduced from 45 to 33 days per year of service, up to a 
maximum of 24 months. The implementation of the reform was phased in at different 
rates for different typologies of workers in order not to retroactively affect established 
rights. The full impact of this measure in terms of job creation and employment 
mobility will only materialise in the long run, with output growth gaining some traction. 
A potential "side effect" of the reform, which will likewise only be visible in the long 
term, is to increase job-to-job-mobility.5  
A reform of the severance payment regime was also implemented in Austria in 2003.6 
The new system, designed to remove obstacles to job mobility, allowed every employee 
to collect entitlements irrespective of the duration of employment. The medium-term 
impact of the Spanish reform on job mobility cannot be tested directly, mainly due to 
the current adverse macroeconomic context and the limited time since the 
implementation of the reform. Instead, we analyse the impact of the reform on the 
search rates of employees hired on open-ended contracts – the so-called on-the-job 
search rate. We argue that an increase in the on-the-job search rate is a lead indicator 
that is likely to anticipate higher rates of job-to-job mobility, which will emerge as soon 
as employment creation gains some traction. To our knowledge, this is the first paper 
assessing the impact of severance payments on the on-the-job search rate. The only 
comparable work is a study by Hofer et al. (2012) on the impact of the new severance 
payment regime in Austria. The results reveal that the medium-term impact of the 
reform on job mobility are statistically significant, but all in all quantitatively rather 
limited. Other factors, such as economic conditions, seem to play a much larger role in 
affecting job mobility.  
Graph 1: On-the-job search rate 
amongst employees hired with 
open-ended contracts in Spain and 
other EU countries 
Graph 2: On-the-job search rate 
amongst employees hired with 
open-ended contracts and 
unemployment rate in Spain 
Source: LFS, own calculations Source: LFS, own calculations 
As shown in Graph 2, the average search rate in the 7 quarters following the reform 
(2012q3-2014q1) is 4.5% as opposed to 3.6% in the period before the reform (2005q1-
2012q1). Mechanically attributing the increase in the search rate to the reform is not 
advisable as other variables might also have affected the observed outcome. The 
population of employees hired before and after the reform is likely to display 
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significantly different characteristics (age, education, tenure, etc.), which affect the 
search rate. Moreover exogenous events – e.g. the sharp increase in unemployment – 
might likewise contribute to an increase or a decrease in search behaviour. Finally, as 
clarified in the following section, the reform did not affect all employees in the same 
way, but had a differentiated impact according to their tenure and the entitlements 
accrued at the time when the reform entered into force.  
Estimating framework 
In the typical micro-econometric evaluation framework (the “potential outcome 
approach”, most commonly called the Roy (1951) Rubin (1974) model), the treatment 
effect is given by a comparison of the treatment outcome (Y1) with a hypothetical 
situation where the same individual does not receive treatment (Y0). The evaluation 
problem arises because we can never observe both potential outcomes for the same 
individual at the same time. The lack of a counterfactual at the individual level is 
overcome by comparing different groups – one of which has been treated and the other 
not (the control group). In our case the control group is composed of all employees with 
an open-ended contract in the years before the reform, while the treated group is 
composed of all employees with an open-ended contract in the years after the reform. 
However, a simple comparison between outcomes of treated and control group is not 
possible if the groups differ in terms of individual characteristics or other exogenous 
conditions that may influence the outcome, in other words, when E(Y0|D=1) ≠ E(Y0|D 
= 0), where D is a binary treatment indicator. In this specific case, one might expect that 
changes in the composition of the workforce affect the search rate. The direction is 
difficult to predict ex-ante: with employment shrinking – for example – the share of 
more educated and more tenured workers has increased with ambiguous impacts on the 
search rate as more tenured workers usually feature lower job-to-job mobility, while 
more educated workers on the contrary tend to be more mobile. However, changes in 
macroeconomic conditions might also affect the search rate. On the one hand, a 
particularly tight labour market could increase wage pressure and induce a higher job 
search. Likewise, greater slack would decrease job-search. However, a inverse relation 
is also possible: recessions might increase the sense of job insecurity and push workers 
to intensify their search as a form of insurance against the risk of involuntary 
unemployment. On the other hand, expectations about the future evolution of the 
economy might also be relevant in explaining search behaviour. Improving expectations 
about the economy might push employees to search for another more remunerative job.  
Econometric techniques allow us to control for differences in the characteristics of the 
treated and the control group that – just like the implementation of the reform – might 
affect the difference in the search effort. In particular, we account for age, gender 
education, nationality and contract tenure. Clearly, individuals observed before and after 
the reform are also different in other dimensions – i.e. they are likely to display non 
observed heterogeneity. Nevertheless, we assume that unobserved characteristics are 
randomly attributed to the treated and control groups. We also control for different 
macroeconomic conditions and expectations at the moment of the data collection, by 
introducing for each quarter the corresponding quarterly rate of unemployment and the 
quarterly average of the monthly sentiment indicator. 
A further complexity is represented by the fact that, in this specific case, the reform 
affects workers differently according to their work tenure. We identify four target 
groups. Group I is composed of all employees hired with an open-ended contract after 
the reform. After the reform, this group enjoys a lower accrual rate and their 
entitlements are limited to 24 months of severance payments. Group II is composed of 
all employees hired before the reform, who have not yet reached the ceiling on 
severance payment entitlements. After the reform this group maintains the entitlements 
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accrued at the higher rate until the introduction of the reform, but is subject to the lower 
accrual rate thereafter and is likewise limited by the ceiling on maximum entitlement. 
Group III is composed of all employees hired with an open-ended contract before the 
reform, who had already exceeded the ceiling of 24 months on entitlements at the 
moment of the reform. After the reform this group basically stops accruing additional 
entitlement and the maximum entitlement is that at the time of entry into operation of 
the reform. Finally, group IV includes employees not affected by the reform. These are 
those who had already reached the maximum entitlement of 42 months at the time of the 
reform. 
The econometric framework relies on a parametric approach. The outcome variable (i.e. 
job-to-job search) is modelled as a function of observed characteristics of the employee 
and state variables. The observed outcome being binary (i.e. 1 if the employee has 
searched for a job in the reference period – i.e. in the four weeks preceding the day of 
the interview, and 0 otherwise), we use a probit model. Observed characteristics include 
a treatment dummy taking the value of 1 if the worker was surveyed after the reform 
and zero otherwise. 7 
The data 
We rely on 33 consecutive waves of the Labour Force Survey, starting from Q1 of 2005 
to Q1 of 2014.8 The estimation sub-sample includes all employees with an open-ended 
contract, since only the latter are affected by the reform. We further restrict the 
estimation sample to private sector workers. As discussed above, we also identify four 
different target groups which we expect to be differently affected by the reform. The 
identification of the subgroups is based on tenure at the time of entry into force of the 
reform. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the whole estimation sample and the 
four target groups, disaggregating observations before and after the reform. Differences 
for the whole sample of employees are small – but noteworthy. Differences are due to 
both cohort effects and the intense labour shedding that occurred following the crisis. 
The employed population after the reform is in general older, more educated, and more 
tenured while the share of female and foreign employees is larger.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics-Characteristics of the sample and the 
target groups (before and after the reform) 
 
Source: Labour force statistics 
As already suggested by Graph 2, the search rate is on average higher after the reform 
than before the reform: on the basis of the selected sample, about 3.6% of employees 
with an open-ended contract looked for another job in the reference period, while the 
post-reform rate is about 4.4%.9 Target group I does not have a specific "counterfactual" 
group before the reform. It is on average younger and better educated. Moreover, it 
displays – by construction – a very low tenure, which probably largely explains the high 
search rate. Target groups II, III and IV display similar trends in terms of demographic 
variables: in the observations after the reforms, they are more educated, older, and more 
Before After Before After Before After Before After Before After
Male (%) 58.1 53.6 - 44.1 54.0 50.9 66.0 64.6 73.4 70.5
Non-European (%) 5.6 7.0 - 12.5 7.3 8.1 1.4 1.5 0.8 0.7
Age 41 43 - 39 38 40 46 49 53 56
No education (%) 0.2 0.2 - 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3
Uncompleted primary education (%) 2.0 1.3 - 1.5 1.8 1.1 2.4 1.4 3.2 1.9
Primary education (%) 12.1 8.1 - 8.8 10.2 7.1 13.4 8.9 23.1 16.4
Lower secondary education (%) 31.0 30.6 - 33.6 31.8 30.4 30.3 30.2 26.6 29.9
Upper secondary education (general) (%) 13.3 13.1 - 12.8 12.8 12.5 13.7 14.2 15.5 17.5
Upper secondary education (professional) (%) 9.9 10.5 - 10.9 10.4 11.0 8.9 9.1 7.5 8.4
Tertiary education (%) 31.5 36.2 - 32.2 32.8 37.7 31.1 36.0 23.7 25.6
Contract tenure (months) 115 128 - 7 53 88 209 265 380 424
Searched for another job (%) 3.6 4.4 - 12.1 4.6 4.5 1.2 1.0 0.3 0.3
Observations 853530 220241 - 18606 614379 155370 149868 32138 89283 14127
Estimation sub-
sample
Target group I Target Group II Target Group III Target Group IV
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tenured. Surprisingly, the search rates for group III and IV are on average lower after 
the reform, though the difference is very small – especially for target group IV. It would 
nevertheless be erroneous to infer that, following the reforms, these target groups are 
less likely to undertake search on-the-job: the lower search rates observed after the 
reform can in fact be entirely attributed to the differences in the observed characteristics 
of the sub-samples before and after the reform. 
Results 
The impact of the reform on the search activity is estimated with alternative 
specifications. Model A simply regresses the outcome variable on the reform dummy 
variable. Model B additionally controls for composition effects, by including the 
demographic variables described in the previous section, with the exception of job 
tenure – namely gender, age, education and nationality. Model C includes tenure as an 
additional control variable (and tenure squared to account for non-linearity) and model 
D further adds state variables, namely the current unemployment rate and the aggregate 
short-term sentiment indicator. Finally model E disaggregates the previous result, by 
estimating the impact of the reform on the four target group. Table 2 reports the 
marginal effects of the reform dummy, which can be interpreted as the impact of the 
reform on the expected search rate.10  
Table 2: Marginal effects of the reform (alternative control groups and 
model specifications) 
Source:Labour force statistics, own calculations 
Figures in bold indicate significance at the 1‰ level, underlined figures indicate significance at the 1% level. 
Model A gives an estimated marginal effect of about 0.8 pp. - the value of the estimated 
coefficient is hardly surprising since, in a regression with a single dummy variable, it 
corresponds to the difference between the search rate pre- and post-reform. More 
interesting is the fact that the difference is highly significant.  
Correcting for composition effects, model B reveals a highly significant and slightly 
higher impact of the reform: 0.9 pp. This result suggests that the impact of the reform is 
actually higher than a crude comparison of the search rates would suggest since the 
population of employees after the reform is ceteris paribus on average less likely to 
search for another job than the population before the reform. The impact of higher 
education and foreign citizenship on mobility is positive, while the impact of age is 
negative. Male employees are, moreover, less likely to search a new job while in 
employment. All in all, the negative age effect prevails over the other characteristics, so 
the additional control variables actually yield a higher estimated impact of the reform. 
Model C introduces contract tenure as an additional control variable: the impact of the 
reform becomes significantly larger – more than 1 pp. As we have seen, the average 
tenure after the reform is much higher than before the reform (mostly due to selective 
Marginal 
effect
Standard error z P>z 
Model A - no additional controls
All sample 0.776% 0.000 17.750 0.000 0.007 0.009
Model B - Only demographics variables
All sample 0.889% 0.000 20.420 0.000 0.008 0.010
Model C - Demographic variables, tenure
All sample 1.147% 0.000 26.270 0.000 0.011 0.012
Model D - Demographic variables, tenure, state variables
All sample 0.832% 0.001 13.250 0.000 0.007 0.010
Model E - Demographic variables, tenure, state variables,  different target groups
Target group I 1.718% 0.001 15.620 0.000 0.015 0.019
Target group II 0.674% 0.001 10.190 0.000 0.005 0.008
Target group III 0.506% 0.002 2.810 0.005 0.002 0.009
Target group IV 0.342% 0.004 0.770 0.441 -0.005 0.012
[95% Conf. Interval]
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labour shedding during the crisis). Since tenure negatively affects search intensity, 
controlling for this dimension leads to a further increase in the estimate of the impact of 
the reform.  
Model D includes the state variables as additional controls: the current unemployment 
rate and the current sentiment indicator. Both variables have a significantly positive 
impact signalling that the deterioration of the labour market conditions induces more 
active search – probably due to a job insecurity effect – while positive expectations 
about the future state of the economy likewise favour more intensive search 
behaviour.11 This model reduces the estimated impact to just above 0.8 pp. 
Finally model E shows the impact of the reform on different target groups. It is 
interesting to see that this more sophisticated model supports the ex-ante expectations of 
decreasing marginal effect of the reform as one moves from group I to group III and no 
effect on group IV.12  
Conclusions 
The full impact of the recently-implemented reform of the severance payment regime 
will require a significant time-lag in order to be assessed empirically. The current 
situation of the labour market – and in particular the slack demand – does not allow a 
fully separation of structural and cyclical components in employment dynamics. 
Whereas the key aim of the reform of dismissal regulation was to reduce disincentives 
for employers to hire using open-ended contracts, the reform may have generated other 
side effects. In particular, reducing the accrual rate of severance payment entitlements 
may also have a positive impact on job-to-job mobility. This hypothesis is tested not by 
looking at job-to-job mobility per se, but rather at on-the-job search.  
The econometric evidence supports the hypothesis that the cap on severance payments 
and the reduced accrual rate may have significantly increased on-the-job search 
amongst employees hired with open ended-contracts. As expected, the impact is 
differentiated across different groups of employees: the change is highest amongst new 
hires and decreases progressively for groups that are only marginally affected by the 
reform. No change in behaviour is observed amongst the group of employees already 
having accrued the maximum entitlement. The differentiated impact over the different 
target groups suggests that, as the composition of the employment population is affected 
by the entry of employees hired after the reform, the aggregate search rate is likely to 
further increase.   
This change in search behaviour – if confirmed in the long run – is likely to lead to 
greater job-to-job mobility. The exact extent impact on job-to-job transitions is, 
nevertheless, difficult to foresee as other elements of the reform may have affected how 
search behaviour leads to actual job transitions. An empirical assessment of the actual 
increase in job-to-job mobility will require some time and, probably, more favourable 
macroeconomic conditions. If confirmed, greater job-to-job mobility might lead to 
increased productivity through faster spread of technology and knowledge embedded in 
human resources. More contained wage dynamic could also result in periods of tighter 
labour market conditions – though arguably the latter effect will only be visible in the 
medium-to-long run given the current level of slack on the labour market. 
Although significant in statistical terms, the increase in the on-the-job search rate is still 
relatively contained, leaving the on-the-job search rate in Spain relative low in 
comparison to other countries. 
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1 Job mobility refers here specifically to mobility from one job to another and is therefore conceptually distinct from employment mobility i.e. the rate of 
transition from one employment status to another, which covers movements in and out of the labour market as well as among different types of employment 
contracts - permanent or temporary employment and part-time or full-time employment.  
2 According to Andersen et al. (Andersen et al., 2008) the highest levels of job mobility are found in the United Kingdom, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, the 
three Baltic states, and – to a smaller extent– Ireland. The relatively lowest levels of job mobility are found in Central European Member States (Poland, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and, to a smaller extent, Hungary), in continental European Member States (Germany, Belgium, Austria) and in 
Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece, and, to a smaller extent Spain and Cyprus). 
3 For recent comparative data and description of the degree of stringency of EPL in OECD countries, see OECD Employment Outlook 2013 at  
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.htm 
4 For a description of the main features of the 2012 labour market reform in Spain, see EC (2014).  
5 To our knowledge this aspect has not been explored in recent evaluations or studies on the impact of labour market reform. 
6 In order to combine the benefits of relatively high job mobility with a system of increasing workers' protection, the new system (Abfertigung Neu) set up 
individual savings accounts managed by employee provision funds (Mitarbeitervorsorgekassen). Job mobility costs for employees are expected to be 
reduced as employees do not lose their entitlement to severance payment when quitting a job. 
7 The latent variable describing the propensity of an employee i to look for a job at time t is defined as:  y∗ = α + βx + γα + δD + ε  
where α  is a constant; α  accounts for differences in macroeconomic conditions at time t; x  is a set of covariates controlling for differences in individual 
characteristics; and D  is the dummy for the treatment effect. ε  is an error term which includes other unobserved characteristics. We assume that the 
unobserved characteristics are randomly attributed to employees that were hired before and after the reform, i.e. E(D ,ε ) = 0. The additional hypothesis 
made is that no other change – other than those controlled for – occurred at the time of implementation of the reform. In reality, several reforms were 
introduced more or less simultaneously, including change in unemployment benefit entitlements, clarification of collective dismissal procedures, wage 
setting procedures and amendments to bargaining practices. Whereas several of these reforms have had a deep impact on the functioning of the labour 
market, they are not likely to have affected the search behaviour of insiders. A possible exception could be represented by the wage setting agreements at 
firm level. By changing the evolution of wages at firm level, it is likely that the expected net value of changing job may be modified. This hypothesis is 
implicitly tested by assessing the impact of the reform on the fourth group referred to above. Indeed, if no significant change in behaviour is observed for 
this group, we can assume that the change observed is exclusively attributable to the change in the severance payment regime. Incidentally, the hypothesis is 
tested ex-post and the correlation coefficient between regression residuals and the treatment dummy is not significantly different from zero. 
8 It is an ongoing survey carried out every quarter and it targets households. Its main objective is to monitor labour force dynamics. The average quarterly 
sample is 65,000 households. We rely on the information at personal level and use only a sub-sample as clarified in the text. 
9 Note that these figures are partly different from those of the graph, discussed in the introduction, since the latter refer to the average of the average search 
rate per quarter, and not to the average search rates across the pooled sample before and after the reform.  
10 We do not report the marginal effects or the estimated coefficients of all control variables, as we are mainly interested in the impact of the reform. Detailed 
results are available upon request. 
11 Statistics on vacancies were also considered, but finally discarded as sentiment indicators – to the extent that they proxy perceptions about future 
possibilities - were considered more appropriate. 
12 The impact on the third group is slightly less significant and not very different from the impact on group II. It is however likely that the average group 
effect conceals significant differences between groups with higher and lower tenures. More interestingly, the disaggregated result also support the hypothesis 
of dynamic effects of the reform: as all new entrants will be fully affected by the reform, the aggregate search intensity is likely to increase over time. 
